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ABSTRACT
A new direction in social perception research is developed. The present research
explored the impact of familiarity and time on social perception processes based on
cognitive neuroscience models, social categorization models, and memory
consolidation constructs. Familiarity was manipulated within an exposure task and time
was manipulated by testing participants both 2-6 hr and 48 hr after the exposure task.
Experiment 1 investigated the influence of familiarity and time on the argument of the
automaticity of social categorization and associated stereotypes by testing the argument
with two separate tasks. Experiment 1a tested the influence of familiarity and time on
associated stereotypes and found that, with familiarity and time, participants responded
to individualizing information faster than to stereotypic information. Experiment 1b
tested the influence of familiarity and time on social categorization and found further
support for the automaticity of social categorization. Experiment 2 further investigated
the influence of familiarity and time on social perception by embedding cognitive loads
within a categorization task. Experiment 2 found little support for the influence of
familiarity and time on social categorization and cognitive loads. The current research
is discussed for its relevance to models of social perception.
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INTRODUCTION
A prevailing argument within social perception research is that social
categorization is automatic. For instance, people perceive information pertaining to a
person’s age or race and then use this information to automatically categorize them into
the corresponding social category. It is further argued that the stereotypes that are
associated with that categorized group are also automatically activated (Fiske, 1989;
Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, & Russin, 2000; Stroessner, 1996) and used to
guide further interaction. Yet this argument is overwhelmingly based on studies that
test only first impressions of newly-learned targets. It does not fully account for the
complexity of social perception as it occurs in the real world. While people might
automatically categorize and stereotype the target individuals in these studies, these
individuals are never seen again and thus have no impact on their lives. In contrast, our
perception of the individuals that we see on a daily basis may proceed differently,
simply because of previous individuating experiences. For example, one might see the
same salesperson every morning when buying coffee on their way to work. Because
these individuals are encountered more than once, the interactions may lead one to
gather information about these individuals. While some of this information may work to
confirm group stereotypes, there may also be personalizing information that goes
beyond basic group membership (e.g., the person always wears the color blue), or
information that might even contradict stereotypes (e.g., this woman is rude, not warm).
A key difference between brief interactions in the lab and real world interactions is that
real world interactions often occur over a period of time, as new information is
integrated into existing information. Thus, memory consolidation constructs provide
1

some insight and guidelines for how time may influence social perception. Because the
majority of past research on social perception has examined first impressions based
solely on photos of target individuals, our understanding of social perception is
incomplete. The research presented here begins to address this important void in the
literature by asking the following questions: How do impressions of others change over
time? Does time change how personalizing information is both represented and
retrieved? How does time influence the degree to which stereotypes versus
individuating information impact perceptions?
Social categorization
Researchers have often argued that the automaticity of social categorization
leads to the automatic activation of associated stereotypes (Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler,
1986; Fazio & Dunton, 1997; Zárate & Smith, 1990). Automatic processes are defined
as “the unintentional or spontaneous activation of some well-learned set of associations
or responses that have been developed through repeated activation in memory”
(Devine, 1989, p.6). Within the social realm, individuals perceive such things as age
and race quickly. Individuals are also extremely well practiced at perceiving others as
either male or female (Blair & Banaji, 1996). A result of these automatic perceptions is
that the stereotypes associated with social groups are then automatically activated
(Kawakami et al., 2000; Zárate & Smith, 1990). As Blair and Banaji state, “that
automatic processes may be involved in stereotyping is disturbing because such
processes reveal the potential to perpetuate prejudice and discrimination independently
of more controlled and intentional forms of stereotyping” (p.1159). For instance,
research on racial categorization has found that individuals are often better at
2

recognizing same race targets compared to other race targets (Levin, 1996; Meissner,
Brigham, & Butz, 2005). This effect is generally interpreted as occurring because
people perceive their in-group members via their individuating features, whereas outgroup members are automatically categorized as part of the out-group without further
thought. This effect, thus, lends credence to the argument that social categorization
and the associated stereotypes are automatic and unintentional.
Research on the automaticity of social categorization has frequently used implicit
tests in order to examine the automatic and unintentional activation and use of
stereotypes. Implicit attitudes can be defined as automatically activated evaluations
(i.e., stereotypes) that function and can be assessed without the individual’s awareness
(Dovidio, Kawakami & Gaertner, 2002). Implicit tests may be described as measures
that do not explicitly ask individuals about their attitudes. One well known implicit test,
the Implicit Association Test (IAT), measures implicit attitudes with the use of evaluative
judgments (Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). In this task, participants are
shown stereotypically White names and stereotypically Black names. Participants then
implicitly and automatically associate positive attitudes with the stereotypically White
names and unpleasant attitudes with the stereotypically Black names due to previously
learned associations, and therefore, respond quicker to those paired items. Indeed,
Greenwald et al. found strong support for this idea within their experiments. Also using
the IAT, Rudman, Greenwald, and McGhee (2001) compared both implicit and explicit
gender stereotypes. In particular, the researchers using sex stereotypes (e.g., males’
association with power and coldness, and females’ association with weakness and
warmth) found that while only men expressed explicit gender stereotypes, both men and
3

women showed strong implicit gender stereotyping. Other implicit tests include reaction
time (RT) paradigms like the ones used in studies done by Zárate, Sanders, and Garza
(2000) and self-report measures such as the stereotypic explanatory bias or the
linguistic intergroup bias (Sekaquaptewa, Espinoza, Thompson, Vargas, & von Hippel,
2003; von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, & Vargas, 1997).
The common theme running through implicit attitude paradigms is that
participants are unaware of what is measured. It is well known that participants often try
to hide or mask their true feelings on some topics when asked explicitly. Implicit
measures, on the other hand, are less open to this conscious editing process (Dovidio,
Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997). When individuals are not given time
or motivation to evaluate the consequences of their actions, the explicit attitudes give
way to the more implicit attitudes (Dovidio et al., 2002). Thus, research has shown that
the automaticity of social categorization can be appropriately examined with the use of
implicit measures.
Whereas most research on social categorization has demonstrated the
automaticity of categorizations with the use of implicit tests, there is an emerging
literature demonstrating the malleability of these categorizations. For instance,
research has found that social categorization processes can be diminished by training
(Blair & Banaji, 1996; Kawakami et al., 2000; Kawakami, Dovidio, & van Kamp, 2005).
Kawakami et al. (2000) found that merely training participants to say “NO” to a
photograph of a target and an associated stereotype for 45 min was sufficient to inhibit
stereotyping for up to 24 hr after training. In fact, this training is analogous to real-life
situations as it is socially undesirable to express stereotypes. This social influence
4

may be acting as our society’s own form of stereotype negation training. For example,
Wheeler and Fiske (2005) demonstrated that racial categorization was diminished
when participants made a conscious effort to individuate targets. It is socially beneficial
for individuals to attempt to view people as individuals rather than be labeled as racist
or sexist. This social motivation may influence the conscious activation of social
perception because it provides some guidelines as to when expressing stereotypes is
deemed acceptable. As a rule, people try to refrain from judging individuals on the
basis of stereotypic information alone (Yzerbyt, Schadron, Leyens, & Rocher, 1994).
This rule then stresses the importance of acquiring additional information about an
individual. Research has additionally shown that when a conscious effort is made to
process information contrary to stereotypic beliefs, stereotype activation is reduced
(Blair & Banaji, 1996).
Providing information about an individual also increases familiarity with that
individual, which in turn impacts perceptions of that individual (Mollarat & Mignon,
2007; Smith, Miller, & Maitner, 2006). For example, minimal familiarity with out-group
target individuals has been shown to inhibit group categorization (Zárate, Stoever,
MacLin, & Arms-Chavez, 2008). Thus, the social goals we live by, which emphasize
the importance of familiarity, can influence social perception.
Neurocognitive research suggests that the effects of familiarity on social
perception are better understood if we distinguish between the cognitive processes
involved when an individual is perceived as a person and the cognitive processes
involved when an individual is perceived in terms of their social group membership
(Zárate et al., 2000; Zárate et al., 2008). Zárate and colleagues proposed that social
5

information is processed within two separate cognitive systems where the right cerebral
hemisphere is better at processing social information in an exemplar-like manner, while
left cerebral hemisphere more efficiently processes social information in a prototype-like
manner. Within these separate perception systems, person perception has been found
to proceed more efficiently within the right cerebral hemisphere, which produces social
representations of persons in terms of their individuating characteristics. Conversely,
group categorization has been found to proceed most efficiently within the left cerebral
hemisphere, which produces social representations of persons in terms of the social
groups or categories that they belong to (e.g., ethnicity, gender, or age). These distinct
cerebral perception systems then allow us to speculate on how familiarity might impact
future group categorizations as familiarity should be able to impact social perception
processes only if there is a distinction between the cognitive processes involved when
an individual is perceived as a person or in terms of their group membership (Zárate et
al., 2000; Zárate et al., 2008).
While there is some evidence minimal familiarity with a person influences social
perception, it is based on paradigms using one hr sessions. It, therefore, does not
address how impressions of others change over time. The proposed research attempts
to address this very question. Using memory consolidation constructs, the primary
research question proposed here focuses on the impact of time on the malleability of
social perception. How do familiarity and time influence social perceptual processes?
What is memory consolidation?
Familiarity is not instantaneous. Acquiring the information necessary for one to
become familiar with another person requires time. The effect of time on social
6

perception highlights an untested domain in social psychology. How does time
influence social perception? Research in the memory consolidation literature provides a
number of insights and guidelines. First, however, it is pertinent to explain what
memory consolidation is and the theory behind it.
Memory consolidation is a time-dependent process where a newly formed and
fragile memory trace is transformed into a stronger and more resilient permanent
memory trace. This transformation results in a memory that is increasingly impervious
to disrupting or competing factors (McGaugh, 2000; Medina, Bekinschtein, Cammarota,
& Izquierdo, 2008; Spear & Mueller, 1984; Walker & Stickgold, 2006).
Memory consolidation research started over 100 years ago with Müller and
Pilzecker (1900) explaining retroactive interference effects. Retroactive interference is
defined as the forgetting of old information due to the competition between the newly
learned information and the old information (Bower, Thompson-Schill, & Tulving, 1994).
Müller and Pilzecker found that the shorter the interval between an initial learning
session and a second learning session, the more information from the initial learning
session was forgotten. The interpretation was that time was essential to form a stable
memory. This initiated the idea that there were cognitive processes that were involved
in changing the vulnerable memory trace into a more stabilized memory over a period of
time. In 1949, Hebb took Müller and Pilzecker’s theory one step further by proposing
that memory consolidation involved a process where short-term memories are
eventually moved into long-term memory stores. Since then, memory consolidation
research has been tested from multiple perspectives. For instance, neuropsychology
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has studied the effects of memory consolidation with the use of retrograde amnesia
patients (Squire, Cohen, & Nadel, 1984).
Memory consolidation theory, however, involves major assumptions and
controversies. One of these debates concerns identifying the specific brain regions that
are involved during consolidation. One hypothesis is that there are two distinct forms of
memory consolidation: cellular consolidation and systems-level consolidation (Medina
et al., 2008). Cellular consolidation is a fast consolidation process that “involves early
molecular and cellular events” (Medina et al., 2008, p. 62). Cellular consolidation lasts
only hours after training and is hypothesized to involve the medial temporal lobe and
regions of the hippocampus. On the other hand, systems-level consolidation is
described as a slow process that occurs over days, can last for weeks to months, and
can be further enhanced if the memory is one that is associated with another memory
previously stored (Dudai & Eisenberg, 2004; Eichenbaum, 2001; Tse, Langston,
Kakeyama, Bethus, Spooner, Wood et al., 2007). Systems-level consolidation has
been argued to involve the interaction between neocortical regions and medial temporal
lobe structures. This interaction is hypothesized to reorganize newly learned memories
into a more stable form as the memory trace slowly begins to exist independently of the
hippocampus and the neocortex starts to support the now long-term memory (Bontempi,
Laurent-Demir, Destrade, & Jaffard, 1999; Dudai & Eisenberg, 2004; Frankland &
Botempi, 2005; McClelland, McNaughten, & O’Reilly, 1995; Medina et al., 2008; Squire
& Alvarez, 1995; Squire, Stark, & Clark, 2004). Other research, however, argues that
the memory trace never exists independently from the hippocampus. Instead, the
argument is made that the hippocampus is imperative throughout the life of the memory
8

trace (Lehmann, Lacanilao, & Sutherland, 2007; Sutherland, Weisand, Mumby, Astur,
Hanlon, Koerner et al., 2001).
Another important debate is the role that sleep plays within memory
consolidation. Sleep has long been argued to be an important factor within memory
consolidation. With time and sleep, memories become progressively more resistant to
disruption from other factors as they are integrated into long term memory (Walker &
Stickgold, 2006). In terms of the systems-level consolidation, research has shown that
both slow-wave sleep and rapid eye movement sleep are required for this transition to
occur (Rasch & Born, 2008; Rauchs, Desgranges, Foret, & Eustache, 2005). For
instance, Stickgold, Scott, Rittenhouse, and Hobson (1999) used a lexical decision task
to explore semantic priming effects within different stages of sleep. Participants were
given a task four times throughout the experiment: prior to sleep, after stage two nonrapid eye movement sleep, after rapid eye movement sleep, and five min after waking in
the morning. The authors found that the stage two non-rapid eye movement sleep and
the rapid eye movement sleep displayed different responses to the lexical decision task.
When awakened after stage two sleep, participants displayed priming effects towards
associated words. When awakened after the rapid eye movement sleep, however,
participants displayed a quicker reaction time towards items that had a weak
association. Thus, the two stages of sleep may add two qualitatively different aspects
towards the consolidation of memories. Moreover, a sleep dependent effect can also
be seen within a 60-90 min nap as long as the nap includes both slow-wave sleep and
rapid eye movement sleep (Mednick, Nakayama, & Stickgold, 2003).
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While the specific neurological and sleep processes involved within systemslevel memory consolidation are still debated, this type of consolidation process is
argued to be involved in the consolidation of declarative memory (Eichenbaum, 2001;
Medina et al., 2008). Specifically, research has consistently shown that systems-level
memory consolidation can improve and enhance declarative memory (DeKoninck,
Lorrain, Christ, Proulx, & Coulombe, 1989; Gais & Born, 2004; Gais, Molle, Helms, &
Born, 2002; Reed & Squire, 1998). The memory consolidation literature also highlights
the relationships between the two types of declarative memory: semantic memory (i.e.,
memory for factual knowledge that people hold about the world and knowledge of
categories; Schacter, Wagner, & Buckner, 2000) and episodic memory (i.e., memory
information about a specific event or experience; Tulving, 1985).
First, during sleep, a newly formed and fragile memory trace undergoes
structural changes that work to strengthen the declarative memories (Fischer,
Drosopoulos, Tsen, & Born, 2006; Gais & Born, 2004; Wagner, Gais, Haider, Verleger,
& Born, 2004). It has been further argued that when this structural change occurs a
consolidation process might not consolidate all declarative memories equally. The
process may even “selectively strengthen[s] memories that were competitively inhibited
by similar but more recently encoded memories” (Drosopoulos et al., 2007, p. 170;
Ekstrand, 1977). Could it be that memory consolidation somehow becomes an ally for
the weaker declarative memories that experience competition from strong and over
learned declarative memories? Drosopoulos and colleagues (2007) showed just that
when they manipulated the amount of retroactive interference as well as the strength of
encoding. The amount of retroactive interference was manipulated by using either an
10

A-B, A-C paradigm (i.e., retroactive interference), or an A-B, C-D paradigm (i.e., no
retroactive interference). Additionally, the authors manipulated the amount of encoding
of both learning paradigms by using either an intense encoding strategy or a weak
encoding strategy. Consequently, Drosopoulos et al. (2007) found that sleep enhanced
only the weakly encoded declarative memories against the effects of retroactive
interference. Thus, the structural change produced within sleep and memory
consolidation strengthens the weakly associated declarative memories against
retroactive interference more so than the strongly associated declarative memories.
Second, memory consolidation processes provide a mechanism through which
episodic memories become integrated with semantic memories (Spear & Mueller,
1984). A basic agreement within memory research is that the two types of memory (i.e.,
semantic and episodic) are intertwined and interdependent as the semantic memory
system is a vital part of episodic memory retrieval. The interdependence between the
two memory systems makes it difficult to test the two separately (Tulving, 1972). It has
been argued that there are really no novel memories because the supposed novel
episodic memories continuously tap into the previously stored semantic memories.
When consolidation is added into the equation, the already existing interdependence,
integration, and association of the episodic with the semantic memories is strengthened
(Spear & Mueller, 1984). This argument begins to provide one with a more specific way
that systems-level memory consolidation enhances memory and, in turn, social
perception. If memory consolidation strengthens the integration of episodic memories
with semantic memories, does time (i.e., memory consolidation) strengthen the
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integration of individuating memories (i.e., episodic) with stereotypic memories (i.e.,
semantic) within social perception?
Time and Social Perception
If memory consolidation processes selectively strengthen weakly associated
declarative memories and provide a mechanism through which episodic memories are
integrated with semantic memories (Spear & Mueller, 1984), how does one start to
integrate social perception and memory consolidation? Social cognition involves
semantic and episodic memory systems as well. For instance, semantic memory has
been shown to elicit ‘know’ responses while episodic memory elicits ‘recollection’
responses (Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1998). Semantic memory is
also thought to be involved within heuristic source monitoring as it involves simple and
effortless cues from a vague feeling of familiarity. On the other hand, episodic memory
might be involved with the systematic source monitoring as this involves a more effortful
recollection process (Sherman & Bessenhoff, 1999). Almeida (2007) argues that social
expectations involve semantic encoding whereas actions that are socially unexpected
additionally involve episodic encoding for further understanding. From a social cognitive
view, knowledge about a specific individual, depending on the information acquired,
includes both stereotypic (i.e., socially expected) and individuating memories (i.e.,
socially unexpected) (Kunda & Thagard, 1996). Thus, individuating memories (i.e.,
specific to that individual) should reflect episodic memory and stereotypic memories
(i.e., general and categorical group information) should reflect semantic memory.
Furthermore, stereotypic memories consist of stronger associations and are over
learned whereas individuating memories consist of only weak associations. Because of
12

this distinction between stereotypic memories and individuating memories, time (i.e.,
memory consolidation) may facilitate individuation. In fact, the structural change
imposed by memory consolidation may selectively work to enhance and buffer the
weakly associated individuating memories.
In addition to the memory research previously discussed (Tulving, 1972), there is
evidence that social perception involves the integration of these two memory types. It is
argued here that the integration found within episodic and semantic memories should
also be found within individuating (i.e., episodic) and stereotypic (i.e., semantic)
memories. Furthermore, this integration should be strengthened with time as research
has shown that the integration of episodic memory within semantic memory is enhanced
and strengthened with memory consolidation (Spear & Mueller, 1984). This integration
provides a mechanism through which individuating experiences with an individual
become associated with that individual over a period of time. Thus, as opposed to
testing automatic associations with newly learned targets, memory consolidation
constructs provide some insight as how to test learned associations with individuals that
are encountered over a period of time.
The Current Research
The current research extends previous research by examining how familiarity
and time impact social perception. Experiment 1 investigated how familiarity and time
impact the automaticity with which social categorization proceeds and associated
stereotypes are activated. Experiment 1 accomplished this by examining the effects of
familiarity and time on social categorization and stereotyping separately. In order to test
the impact of familiarity and time on the automaticity of associated stereotypes,
13

Experiment 1a used a lexical decision task (LDT). In order to test the impact of
familiarity and time on the automaticity of social categorization, Experiment 1b used a
photo categorization task. As both Experiment 1a and Experiment 1b were based on
memory consolidation constructs, it was hypothesized that familiarity and time would
enhance and stabilize individuating memories (i.e., unique traits) due to the
strengthened integration between the individuating memories and the automatic
stereotypic traits. Experiment 2 examined the impact of familiarity and time on social
perception with cognitive loads. It was hypothesized that, with familiarity and time,
individuating memories of targets would be more resistant to concurrent loads when
compared to targets that were not encoded with familiarity and time.
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Experimental Overview
As depicted within Figure 1, the current research involved having participants
participate across two days and three experimental sessions. The first day consisted of
the first and second experimental session with an approximate 2-6 hr delay (i.e., day 1)
between the two experimental sessions. The second day consisted of the third
experimental session and occurred 48 hr after the beginning of the first experimental
session (i.e., day 2).
Experimental session one included an exposure task where participants initially
learned information about 12 target individuals. Experimental session two included a
brief relearning task as well as the day 1 LDT and day 1 categorization task 2-6 hr after
exposure of Experiment 1. Experimental session three included a brief relearning task,
the day 2 LDT, the day 2 categorization task 48 hr after exposure of Experiment 1,
another brief relearning task, and, finally, Experiment 2 (i.e., categorization task with
cognitive loads). After participants completed Experiment 2 they were then debriefed
and dismissed. Thus, all tests and experiments employed a within-participants
experimental design.
Secondary Issues
Relearning Tasks. Throughout the experiments, three brief relearning tasks were
employed immediately prior to all tests. The relearning tasks consisted of PowerPoint
slideshows that exposed participants to the target once more. As participants were
tested over a period of days, the use of the relearning tasks would then reduce group
mean differences between the day 1 and day 2 tasks.

15

Self-Statements. All of the learning materials used within the exposure task
included statements structured in the first-person that were meant to be perceived as
being written by the targets themselves (Carlston & Skowronski, 1994). These selfstatements (e.g., “I am persistent.”) were used for two specific reasons. First,
individuals tend to believe that these statements could have actually been received from
the actual target, therefore, adding more perceived validity to the task. Second,
statements structured in this way focus the participant on their impression of the target
and avoid possibly competing thoughts of other motives or individuals (Carlston &
Skowronski, 1994).
Explicit Sexism Questionnaires. At the end of the two experiments, two sexism
questionnaires were given to participants: The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick &
Fiske, 1996) and the Ambivalence toward Men Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1999). The
social category used within the proposed research was sex. Using sex as the social
category allows for both in-group and out-group testing. Research, however, shows
that participants’ explicit sexist attitudes can influence or predict the level of target
individuation and memory for targets (Stewart, Harris, van Knippenberg, Hermsen, Joly,
& Lippman, 2006; Stewart, van Knippenberg, Joly, Lippman, Hermsen, & Harris, 2004;
Stewart & Vassar, 2000; Stewart, Vassar, Sanchez, & David, 2000). For instance,
Stewart and colleagues found that both male and female participants who hold explicit
sexist attitudes towards females or female roles exhibit more errors within a female
individuation task.
Thus, the measurement of sex-based explicit attitudes becomes important. The
Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996) measured participants’ sexist
16

attitudes towards females (i.e., “Women seek to gain power by getting control over men”
and “Women should be cherished and protected by men”). This scale was measured
on a five point Likert scale with 1 as “disagree strongly” and 5 as “agree strongly” and
has a reported Cronbach’s alpha coefficient ranging from .76 to .88 (Conn, Hanges,
Sipe, & Salvaggio, 1999).
The targets within the experiments, however, were not solely female. Therefore,
a similar scale was used to assess the participants’ explicit sexist attitudes towards
males. The Ambivalence toward Men Inventory was administered (Glick & Fiske,
1999). This scale measured participants’ explicit attitudes towards males (i.e., “Men act
like babies when they are sick.”). This scale was measured on a five point Likert scale
with 1 as “disagree strongly” and 5 as “agree strongly” and has a Cronbach’s alpha
coefficient ranging from .83 to .87 (Glick & Fiske, 1999).
Other Questionnaires. Throughout the two experiments four additional
questionnaires were given to the participants: A sleep check questionnaire, a sleep
quality questionnaire, an impression formation questionnaire, and a prior familiarity
check.
The sleep check questionnaire, Appendix A, was administered to ensure that
participants did not sleep (i.e., nap) for more than 30 min during the first break as it has
been shown that 60-90 min naps that contain both REM and slow-wave sleep may elicit
memory consolidation processes (Mednick et al., 2003). The data for participants who
indicated that they slept for more than 30 min during the short interim were not used in
the analyses.
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A sleep quality questionnaire, Appendix B, was administered to assess the
participants’ total amount of sleep and the restorative value of this sleep during the 48
hr break. This measure helped to ensure that participants were actually sleeping as the
experiments did not employ common memory consolidation sleep study measures.
A short impression formation questionnaire, Appendix C, was also administered
to facilitate the participants’ ability to form an impression of each target. This
questionnaire consisted of two questions assessing the participants’ impression of the
targets.
Finally, within the prior familiarity check, Appendix D, participants were asked to
indicate whether they personally knew any targets outside of the experiment. The data
for participants who indicated that they did personally know targets were not used in the
analyses.
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EXPERIMENT 1
Methods overview
Experiment 1 investigated the influence of familiarity and time on the automaticity
of social categorization and associated stereotypes. To accomplish this research goal,
time was manipulated between two separate social perception tasks (i.e., Experiment
1a - LDT and Experiment 1b - categorization task). The categorization tasks were
designed to test the automaticity of social categorization. The lexical decision tasks
were designed to test the automaticity of the associated stereotypes. Prior to all tasks
all participants completed an exposure task via PowerPoint slide show where they
learned about 12 targets. Each slide contained a photo, one unique trait, and two selfstatements of how that target exhibited that unique trait.
As depicted in Figure 2, participants were then asked to complete two test
sessions that included both a LDT and a categorization task. While these test sessions
involved the same methodological procedures, time between exposure and test was
manipulated within the two test sessions. In order to test memories within a one day
period, the first session (i.e., day 1 LDT and day 1 categorization task) was completed
approximately 2-6 hr after the exposure task and included one half of the 12 learned
targets. It was expected that this moderate break between the exposure task and the
first test session allowed for a sufficient amount of time for normal day-to-day
interference to occur as well as serve as an elimination of short-term memory effects.
In order to test memories after a 48 hr period, the second session of tests (i.e., day 2
LDT and day 2 categorization task) were completed 48 hr after the exposure task and
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included the remaining half of the learned targets. Based upon memory consolidation
findings and constructs, it was expected that the 48 hr break allowed for a sufficient
amount of sleep.
Hypotheses
Experiment 1a – LDT. Within Experiment 1a, it was hypothesized that
participants would respond to the unique/individuating traits associated with the learned
targets faster after a 48 hr consolidation time (i.e., day 2 LDT) than after only a same
day memory retention interval (i.e., day 1 LDT). Specifically for day 1 LDT, it was
hypothesized that participants would respond to the stereotypic traits faster than the
unique traits for both the learned targets and novel targets. In contrast, for day 2 LDT, it
was hypothesized that the participants would respond to the unique/individuating traits
associated with the learned targets faster than when associated with the novel targets.
Moreover, it was hypothesized that participants who had high explicit sexist attitudes
towards females would respond faster to the female stereotypic traits. It was also
hypothesized that females who held high explicit sexist attitudes towards males would
respond faster to the male stereotypic traits.
Experiment 1b – Categorization Task. Within Experiment 1b, it was
hypothesized that participants would categorize learned targets faster as a familiar
target when the exposure was 48 hr earlier (i.e., day 2 categorization) than when the
exposure was within the same day (i.e., day 1 categorization). Specifically for the day 1
categorization task, it was hypothesized that participants would be faster to categorize
both learned targets and novel targets by sex than as familiar. Specifically for the day 2
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categorization task, it was hypothesized that the participants would categorize the
learned targets as familiar faster than categorize the new targets as novel.
Overall Hypotheses. Collectively within both day 2 LDT and categorization task,
it was further hypothesized that that there would be no significant differences between
the unique/stereotypic traits or the categorization type (i.e., sex or familiar) for the
learned targets. According to memory consolidation constructs, the memories should
become integrated with the added time. Due to the repeated testing, it was also
hypothesized that participants would respond faster to the learned targets within both
day 2 tasks than the day 1 tasks.
Experiment 1a – LDT
METHOD
Participants
A total of 89 undergraduate Introduction to Psychology students were recruited
via the Experimetrix system at the University of Texas at El Paso. Five participants did
not fully complete the experiment because they failed to attend a session. Four of these
participants failed to appear for the 3rd session and 1 participant failed to appear for
both the 2nd and 3rd session. Thus, data from these participants were not analyzed due
to measurement attrition.
Next, a total of 28 participants were removed from analyses in a step-wise
fashion. Twenty-two participants were deleted from analyses because they indicated
knowing the targets personally. As this experiment relies on conveying information
about the learned target individuals in order to gain a sense of familiarity, the
participants that personally knew the learned targets also knew this information was
21

incorrect. If participants personally knew a novel target, that target would no longer be
novel. Second, an additional 3 participants were removed from analyses because they
reported sleeping more than 30 min during the 2-6 hr break between the exposure task
and the day 1 LDT. While the present experiments did not test sleep patterns, creating
the cut off at more than 30 min of sleep serves as a conservative way to eliminate any
possible sleep-dependent learning that may confound the manipulation of time. Finally,
an additional 2 participants were removed from analyses because they reported that
they did not speak English.
After these deletions, data from 51 (24 female and 27 male) participants were
analyzed. An a priori power analysis, conducted via G*Power 3.0.5 (Faul, Erdfelder,
Lang, & Buchner, 2007), indicated that the total number of participants needed in order
to obtain a power of .81 was 42. Thus, the number of participants analyzed within this
study met the a priori power criterion.
Of the analyzed participants, 37 self-reported to be Mexican-American. The
remaining participants reported themselves to be African-American (n=4), AsianAmerican (n=1), European-American (n=3), Mexican-National (n=1), and 5 participants
identified as “other”. The mean participant age was 22 with a range from 18 – 56 and a
mode of 18.
Materials
Photo Stimuli. The same type of photos was used within Experiment 1a ,
Experiment 1b, and Experiment 2 and will only be described in full detail here.
Materials included 18 Latino and 18 Latina frontal head and neck stimulus color photos
with 75 dpi. Each stimulus photo was approximately 7cm high (subtending 6.47
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degrees of visual angle) and 6cm wide (subtending 5.55 degrees of visual angle). All
photos were pilot-tested to ensure that the targets in the photos were perceived as
Latina/o individuals in order to control for ethnicity effects. All of the individuals in the
stimulus photos were from the same approximate age group (18-25) and did not have
any major distinguishing features (e.g., glasses, facial hair). The 36 (18 male and 18
female) photos were then randomly divided into one “learned” set of 6 male and 6
female photos and 4 “novel” sets of 3 male and 3 female photos. In order to reduce any
repetition priming effects, the “learned” set of photos were further randomly divided into
2 “learned” sets. Also to reduce repetition priming and to ensure novel photos remained
novel, only 2 of the 4 sets of novel photos were used within Experiment 1a (i.e., novel
set 1 was used within the day 1 LDT and novel set 2 was used within the day 2 LDT).
The remaining 2 sets were used within Experiment 1b. Each set of photos represent an
initial exposure sequence to which participants were randomly assigned. Within each of
these initial exposure sequences, the male and female photos were randomly
dispersed.
Word Stimuli. Materials also include 12 male stereotypic traits (e.g., cold, rude),
12 female stereotypic traits (e.g., warm, weak), 24 unique/individuating traits (e.g.,
likeable, anxious), and 48 non-words (e.g., ciern, losri). All of the traits were pilot-tested
to ensure that they were perceived as the correct type of trait. In order to reduce
repetition priming effects, all traits and non-words were divided into 2 groups (i.e., 6
male stereotypic traits, 6 female stereotypic traits, 12 unique/individuating traits, and 24
non-words). Both sets of traits also had an equal lexical frequency mean (CELEX
Lexical Database, 1995). Each set of words represents an initial exposure sequence to
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which participants were randomly assigned and ensured that participants were not
exposed to the same word stimuli between the day 1 and day 2 LDT tasks. In addition
to the words, a total of 48 sentences (i.e., 2 sentences per unique/individuating trait)
were used within the exposure task. As the sentences were meant to describe how a
target exemplifies each unique/individuating trait, they were piloted-tested to ensure that
the sentences correctly described each unique/individuating trait. The sentences were
also gender neutral. Additionally, 12 names were used within the experiment. See
Appendix E for all word stimuli.
Questionnaires. Four questionnaires were administered to the participants within
Experiment 1: a demographic questionnaire, a sleep check, a sleep quality
questionnaire, the prior familiarity check, and an impression formation questionnaire.
Testing Materials. All tests were programmed and administered through
SuperLab 4.0 software and responses were recorded via a RX-820 response pad that
ensures 1 ms accuracy (Cedrus Corporation, 2007). Surveys, with the exception of the
impression formation questionnaire, were administered online via Surveymonkey.com
(2009).
Procedure
Participants were told that the experiment concerned memory for individuals and
that they would be performing memory tasks during three experimental sessions over a
period of two days.
Upon arrival to the experimental laboratory, participants were shown into a quiet
and secluded room, asked to sit in front of any computer, and were given an informed
consent document to read and sign. Participants were then asked to sign up for the
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second and third session times that were convenient for them as well as provide an
alternative ID. This alternative ID could have been anything that the participant would
recognize with the exception of their name, initials, social security number, or student
ID. The alternative ID that the participant chose was entered on every form the
participant used within the experiment along with the subject ID number assigned to the
participant. Participants were then asked to complete the demographic questionnaire
on the computer.
Exposure Task. The exposure task consisted of a Microsoft PowerPoint slide
show and the impression formation questionnaire. Prior to the participants’ arrival, an
exposure condition was randomly assigned to each computer. The exposure condition
counterbalanced the order of the initial exposure to each target as well as
counterbalanced the information that was paired with each target. The slideshow
included 12 target individuals (6 female and 6 male) with 1 target presented per slide.
Each slide included a photo of the target, a name of the target, a sentence specifying a
unique trait related to that target, and two sentences that served as examples of how
the target exhibits that trait. All of the sentences appeared to be generated by the
targets themselves. Each slide was shown a total of 3 times: once for 30 s and then
twice for 15 s for a total of 1 min per slide. The exposure task took a total of 12 min and
the target photos were randomized within each exposure sequence. Participants were
instructed to study the given information and form an impression of each person.
Participants were also instructed to fill out the impression formation questionnaire about
each target during the initial 30 s exposure. After the exposure task was finished,
participants were given an experimental reminder note that provided the date and times
25

for the second and third session that the participant had signed up for previously.
Participants were then dismissed and verbally reminded to return to complete the
second experimental session later that same day.
Lexical Decision Tasks
Day 1 LDT. Upon returning for the second session, participants were asked to
complete the sleep check questionnaire on the computer. Next, a brief relearning task
was administered on the computer. The relearning task was composed of another
PowerPoint slide show that included the 12 previously learned target individuals (from
the exposure task) with 1 target presented in each slide. Each slide contained only the
name of the target, the photo of the target, and the sentence describing a
unique/individuating trait related to that target and was presented for 5 s each. The
entire reminder task took a total of 1 min. Then, the participants read the instructions
and completed the day 1 LDT. Within the day 1 LDT, a blank screen was presented for
1000 ms. A fixation point (X) was then presented centrally on the screen for 500 ms.
Next, a photo was presented centrally on the computer screen for 400 ms. A blank
screen was then presented for 50 ms, and finally, the participants were presented with a
letter string for 1500 ms or until the participant responded.
Using the response pad placed in front of them, participants were instructed to
decide, as quickly and accurately as possible, whether the letter string was a word or a
non-word by pressing the appropriately labeled keys on the response pad. If the letter
string was a word, participants were instructed to press ‘4’. If the letter string was a
non-word, participants were instructed to press ‘5’. The photos used in the day 1 LDT
consisted of the first learned photo set (i.e., 6 of the 12 learned targets) and 6 novel
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targets. The letter strings used within the day 1 LDT consisted of 12 gender
stereotypes, 12 unique (non-gender stereotypic) traits, and 24 non-words. This test had
3 separate blocks of trials with a 30 s break in-between each block. The first block was
practice to help participants become accustomed to the task. Within the practice block,
a photo of either a banana or an apple was shown, followed by a letter string. The letter
strings within the practice block were either a non-word or a non-trait word (i.e., school
and house). Within the second block, each target was paired with 4 trials (i.e.,
consistent gender stereotype, unique trait, and two non-words). The third block was a
replication of the second block with all trials in each block randomized. The day 1 LDT
consisted of a total of 104 trials and took approximately 10 min to complete. Upon
completion of the day 1 LDT, participants then completed the day 1 categorization task
described in detail within Experiment 1b.
Day 2 LDT. After returning from the 48 hr break, participants were asked to
complete the sleep quality questionnaire on the computer. Next, the same reminder
task was again administered. Participants then read the instructions for and completed
the day 2 LDT. The methods for this test remain the same as used within the day 1
LDT with two important distinctions. First, the photos used within the day 2 LDT
consisted of the second learned photo set (i.e., the other ½ of the 12 learned targets
from the exposure task) and 6 novel targets. Also, the letter strings used within day 2
LDT consisted of the 12 gender stereotypes, 12 unique (non-gender stereotypic) traits,
and 24 non-words that were not used within the day 1 LDT. The day 2 LDT also
consisted of 104 trials and took approximately 10 min to complete. Upon completion of

27

the day 2 LDT, participants then completed the day 2 categorization task described in
detail within Experiment 1b.
RESULTS
Consistent with previous research (Zárate et al., 2000; 2008), only correct RTs
between 200 ms to 1,500 ms were analyzed. RTs below 200 ms are considered too
fast for participants to have correctly completed the task and RTs above 1500 ms are
considered too slow to provide a valid assessment of processing speed. When the
aggregate means were evaluated for normality, the response latencies were positively
skewed. Thus, all response latencies were replaced by their inverse (Ratcliff, 1993).
This transformation produced a normal distribution of latency data.
The data were first analyzed within a 2 (Time: day 1 LDT vs. day 2 LDT) X 2
(Target Type: learned vs. novel) X 2 (Trait Type: stereotypic vs. unique) repeated
measures ANOVA with RT serving as the dependent variable. First, this analysis
revealed three main effects. As predicted, a significant main effect of time was found,
F(1,50)=12.85, p=.0008, where participants exhibited overall faster RTs within the day 2
LDT (M=552, SD=72) than within the day 1 LDT (M=594, SD=99). Second, a significant
main effect of target type was found, F(1,50)=16.38, p=.0002, where participants
exhibited overall faster RTs for learned targets (M=536, SD=73) than novel targets
(M=583, SD=87). Third, a significant main effect of trait type was shown, F(1,50)=4.79,
p=.033, where participants exhibited overall faster RTs for stereotypic traits (M=570,
SD=81) than unique traits (M=577, SD=78).
This analysis also revealed a significant Target Type X Trait Type interaction,
F(1,50)=8.23, p=.006. To decompose this interaction, two separate ANOVAs were
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conducted with each comparing responses to learned and novel targets with either the
unique traits or stereotypic traits. For the unique traits, there was a significant main
effect of Target Type, F(1,50)=22.81, p<.0001. As depicted in Figure 3, unique traits
were responded to faster when associated with the learned targets (M=562, SD=73)
than the novel targets (M=591, SD=90). On the other hand, there was no significant
difference for RTs to the stereotypic traits between the learned (M=565, SD=79) and
novel targets (M=574, SD=89), F(1,50)=2.99, ns.
The initial analysis also revealed a significant 3-way interaction that included
Time X Target Type X Trait Type, F(1,50)=12.27, p=.001. Because the primary focus of
this study was the impact of time on learned versus novel targets, this 3-way interaction
was decomposed by analyzing the learned and novel targets separately to identify
differences within a multitude of analyses.
The first test included the learned targets in a 2 (Time: day 1 LDT vs. day 2 LDT)
X 2 (Trait Type: stereotypic vs. unique) repeated measures ANOVA and revealed a
significant Time X Trait Type interaction, F(1,50)=11.21, p=.001. Once again, to
decompose this interaction, two separate ANOVAs were conducted with each
comparing responses within the day 1 LDT and day 2 LDT with either the unique traits
or stereotypic traits. For the unique traits, there was a significant main effect of Time,
F(1,50)=16.02, p=.0002. As predicted, participants responded significantly faster to the
unique traits within the day 2 LDT (M=535, SD=73) than within day 1 LDT (M=589,
SD=100) when associated with the learned targets (See Figure 4). This was not found
for the stereotypic traits between the day 1 LDT (M=573, SD=100) and the day 2 LDT
(M=557, SD=85), F(1,50)=.70, ns (See Figure 4).
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The next test included the novel targets as repeated measures in the same
analysis and produced only a significant Trait Type main effect, F(1,50)=11.34, p=.001.
As shown in Figure 5, participants responded significantly faster to the stereotypic traits
(M=574, SD=89) than to the unique traits (M=591, SD=90).
Day 1 LDT Analyses
Next, the 2 LDTs (i.e., day 1 and day 2) were analyzed separately. For the day
1 LDT, the data were first analyzed within a 2 (Target Type: learned vs. novel) X 2 (Trait
Type: stereotypic vs. unique) repeated measures ANOVA with RT serving as the
dependent variable. As predicted, this analysis revealed a significant Trait Type main
effect, F(1,50)=10.69, p=.002, where participants responded to the stereotypic traits
(M=587, SD=99) faster than to the unique traits (M=600, SD=104, See Figure 6).
This analysis also revealed a significant Target Type main effect, F(1,50)=12.07,
p=.001, where participants responded to traits associated with the learned targets
(M=581, SD=95) significantly faster than to traits associated with the novel targets
(M=607, SD=112).
Day 2 LDT Analyses
For the day 2 LDT, the same repeated measures ANOVA described within day 1
LDT analyses also produced a significant target type main effect, F(1,50)=8.68, p=.004,
where participants responded to the traits associated with the learned targets (M=546,
SD=73) significantly faster than to the traits associated with the novel targets (M=558,
SD=77). In addition, this analysis produced a significant Target Type X Trait Type
interaction, F(1,50)=27.38, p<.0001. To decompose this interaction, two separate
ANOVAs were conducted with each comparing responses to learned and novel targets
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with either the unique traits or the stereotypic traits. For the unique traits, there was a
significant main effect of Target Type, F(1,50)=36.42, p<.0001. As predicted, unique
traits were responded to faster when associated with the learned targets (M=535,
SD=73) than the novel targets (M=570, SD=83). This effect was not found for the
stereotypic traits when associated between the learned (M=557, SD=85) and novel
targets (M=547, SD=83), F(1,50)=1.11, ns. In addition, two separate ANOVAs were
conducted with each comparing responses to stereotypic and unique/individuating traits
with either the learned targets or the novel targets. While it was predicted that there
would not be a significant difference between the unique and stereotypic traits when
associated with the learned targets, a significant Trait Type main effect, F(1,50)=8.03,
p=.0066, was found. When associated with the learned targets during the day 2 LDT,
participants responded to the unique traits significantly faster (M=535, SD=73) than to
the stereotypic traits (M=557, SD=85, See Figure 7). In contrast, a Trait Type main
effect was also found for novel targets, F(1,50)=10.52, p=.002, where participants
responded to the stereotypic traits (M=547, SD=83) significantly faster than the unique
traits (M=570, SD=83, See Figure 7).
Explicit Sexism Scale Analyses
Both the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996) and the
Ambivalence toward Men Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1999) failed to produce any
significant or interesting correlations within the LDT analyses. Additionally, neither scale
was a significant moderator of the main reported analysis and was thus dropped from
further analyses.
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Exploratory Post-hoc Analyses
Because Experiment 1 employed sex as the tested social category, exploratory
analyses were conducted to investigate possible participant sex effects. In order to look
for participant sex effects, the data were again analyzed within a 2 (Time: day 1 LDT vs.
day 2 LDT) X 2 (Target Type: learned vs. novel) X 2 (Trait Type: stereotypic vs. unique)
X 2 (Participant Sex) mixed measures ANOVA with RT serving as the dependent
variable and participant gender as a between-participants variable. This analysis
revealed only a significant target type X participant sex interaction, F(1,49)=7.77,
p=.007. Female participants responded overall faster to the stereotypic traits (M=552,
SD=61) than the unique traits (M=567, SD=54) while male participants responded to the
stereotypic traits (M=586, SD=93) and unique traits (M=585, SD=95) with equal speed.
The possible effects of sleep were also examined within this experiment. Neither
the amount of sleep participants reported during the two nights nor the self-reported
restorative nature of the participants’ sleep had a significant impact on results.
Additionally, the results were not changed when either the amount of sleep or the
restorative nature of sleep were used as covariates.
Experiment 1b – Categorization Task
METHOD
Participants & Procedure
Experiment 1a (i.e., LDT) and 1b (i.e., categorization) were run simultaneously
with the same participants. Thus, the participants analyzed within Experiment 1a
remain the same as within Experiment 1b with one distinction. An additional selfidentified Mexican-American male was not analyzed due to measurement error (i.e., the
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participant mistakenly completed the day 2 LDT rather than the day 2 categorization
task).
With the exception of one important distinction, the photos used within the
categorization studies largely remain the same as Experiment 1a. As described
previously within the Experiment 1a methods, 36 (18 male and 18 female) photos were
randomly divided into 1 “learned” set of 6 male and 6 female photos and 4 “novel” sets
of 3 male and 3 female photos. The 2 “novel” sets of photos that were not used within
Experiment 1a were used within Experiment 1b. This was done to ensure that the novel
photos remained novel to the participants throughout the duration of both experiments
and reduce repetition priming effects.
Day 1 Categorization Task. After returning from the 2-6 hr break and completing
the day 1 LDT, participants then read the instructions and completed the day 1
categorization task. Within this test, a blank screen was presented for 1000 ms. A
fixation point (X) was then presented centrally on the screen for 500 ms. Next, a photo
was presented centrally on the computer screen for 400 ms. A blank screen was then
presented for 50 ms, and finally, the participants were presented with a group label for
1500 ms or until the participant responded. Using the response pad placed in front of
them, participants were instructed to decide, as quickly and accurately as possible,
whether the group label matched the previously shown target by pressing the
appropriately labeled keys on the response pad. If the target in the photo could be
correctly categorized with the group label, participants were instructed to press ‘4’. If
the target in the photo could not be correctly categorized with the group label,
participants were instructed to press ‘5’. The photos used in the day 1 categorization
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task consisted of the same learned photo set used within the day 1 LDT (i.e., 6 or ½ of
the 12 learned targets from the exposure task) as well as 6 novel targets. The group
labels used within both categorization tasks consisted of “Woman,” “Man,” “Old,” or
“New”. The terms “Old” and “New” refer to whether the targets were part of the
exposure task (i.e., familiar) or novel targets. Due to a possible semantic confusion
between the word “Old” and a person’s age, participants were explicitly and verbally
informed that the category “Old” meant only that they had seen that person before (i.e.,
familiar) within the experiment and not the target’s age.
The day 1 categorization task consisted of 3 separate blocks of trials with a 30 s
break in-between each block. The first block was practice to help participants become
accustomed to the task. Within the first block, a photo of either a banana or an apple
was shown and followed the group label “banana” or “apple”. Within the second block,
each target photo was paired with 4 trials (i.e., each group label). The third block was a
replication of the first block with all trials in each block randomized. The first
categorization task consisted of a total of 100 trials and took approximately 10 min to
complete. Upon completion of the day 1 categorization task, participants were then
dismissed and reminded to return for the final experimental session 48 hr later.
Day 2 Categorization Task. After returning from the 48 hr break and completing
the day 2 LDT, participants then read the instructions and completed the day 2
categorization task. Again, the methods for this test remain the same as used within the
day 1 categorization task with one exception. The photos used within the day 2
categorization task consisted of the other learned photo set (i.e., the other ½ of the 12
learned targets from the exposure task) and 6 novel targets. The day 2 categorization
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task also consisted of a total of 100 trials and took approximately 10 min to complete.
After the completion of the day 2 categorization task, the participants then completed
Experiment 2.
RESULTS
Response times (RTs) below 200 ms were deleted from analyses. Consistent
with previous research (Zárate et al., 2000; 2008), only correct RTs between 200 ms
and 1,500 ms were analyzed. When the aggregate means were evaluated for
normality, the data were normally distributed and no transformations were performed.
The data were first analyzed within a 2 (Time: day 1 categorization task vs. day 2
categorization) X 2 (Target Type: learned vs. novel) X 2 (Categorization Type: gender
vs. familiar) repeated measures ANOVA with RT serving as the dependent variable.
This analysis revealed three main effects. First, as predicted, a significant main effect
of Time was found, F(1,49)=27.06, p<.0001, where participants exhibited overall faster
RTs within the day 2 categorization task (M=709, SD=108) than within the day 1
categorization task (M=776, SD=117). Second, a significant main effect of Target Type
was found, F(1,49)=39.33, p<.0001, where participants exhibited overall faster RTs for
learned targets (M=726, SD=87) than novel targets (M=780, SD=105; See Figure 8).
Third, a significant main effect of Categorization Type was found, F(1,49)=104.18,
p<.0001, where participants exhibited overall faster RTs within the gender
categorization (M=671, SD=81) than within the familiar categorization (M=818,
SD=125). This analysis also revealed a significant Time X Target Type interaction,
F(1,49)= 4.89, p=.031. In order to decompose this interaction, difference scores
between day 1 categorization task and day 2 categorization task for both the learned
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and novel targets were analyzed and produced a significant main effect of Time
F(1,49)=4.89, p=.031. RTs for the novel targets between day 1 categorization task and
day 2 categorization task (M=78, SD=104) differed more than for the learned targets
between day 1 categorization task and day 2 categorization task (M=47, SD=93).
However, the predicted 3–way interaction of Time X Target Type X
Categorization Type was not significant, F(1,49)=2.10, p=.153. In order to test for the
hypothesized effects within day 1 categorization task, a 2 (Target Type: learned vs.
novel) X 2(Categorization Type: gender vs. familiar) repeated measures ANOVA with
RT serving as the dependent variable was conducted. This analysis did not produce
the predicted Target Type X Categorization type interaction, F(1,49)=2.77, ns. In order
to test for the hypothesized effects with the day 2 categorization task, the same analysis
was conducted. This analysis also did not produce the predicted Target Type X
Categorization type interaction, F(1,49)=0.00, ns.
Exploratory Post-hoc Analyses
In order to test for participant sex effects, the data were again analyzed within a 2
(Time: day 1 categorization task vs. day 2 categorization task) X 2 (Target Type:
learned vs. novel) X 2 (Categorization Type: gender vs. familiar) X 2 (Participant Sex)
mixed measures ANOVA with RT serving as the dependent variable and participant sex
as a between-participants variable. This analysis failed to reveal any significant
Participant Sex effects.
The possible effects of sleep were also examined within this experiment. Neither
the amount of sleep participants reported during the two nights nor the self-reported
restorative nature of the participants’ sleep had a significant impact on results.
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Additionally, the results were not changed when either the amount of sleep or the
restorative nature of sleep were used as covariates.
DISCUSSION
Experiment 1 investigated the influence of familiarity and time on the argument of
the automaticity of social categorization and associated stereotypes. To accomplish
this research goal, time was manipulated between two separate social perception tasks
(i.e., Experiment 1a - lexical decision task and Experiment 1b - categorization task).
The categorization tasks were designed to test the automaticity of social categorization
and the lexical decision tasks were designed to test the automaticity of the associated
stereotypes. Prior to all tests, participants learned personalizing information about 12
targets and then were tested via the two tasks both 2-6 hr and 48 hr later.
As predicted, Experiment 1a found that participants were quicker to associate
unique/individuating information with novel targets when tested 48 hr after the exposure
than when tested 2-6 hr after the exposure. This effect was not found for the
stereotypic information associated with the learned targets or for the novel targets.
Thus, participants were only significantly faster to react to individualizing information
when associated with the learned targets when enough time had passed for those
memory traces to stabilize. Moreover, Experiment 1a also found that with time and
familiarity, participants were significantly faster to respond to the unique/individuating
information than to the stereotypic information. On the other hand, Experiment 1b failed
to find any of the hypothesized effects with the exception that participants were overall
faster at day 2 than during day 1. Experiment 1b did find, however, that participants
were overall significantly faster to categorize the learned targets than the novel targets.
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Thus, Experiment 1b provided further evidence that social categorization may, in
fact, be an automatic process. Moreover, the addition of familiarity and time seems to
facilitate rather than impede social categorization. Experiment 1a, on the other hand,
found evidence that the associated stereotypes are not always automatically activated.
That is, when participants were provided with individualizing information about a target
and time for those memory traces to become enhanced and stabilized, the
individualizing information was activated faster. Moreover, when individuals were given
time for the individualizing memory traces to become enhanced and stabilized, they not
only used that information faster than without time but they were now faster to rely on
the individualizing information rather than the stereotypical information. Thus, in
contrast to previous arguments, Experiment 1a found support for the hypothesis that
individualizing (or personalized) information is activated quicker than stereotypical
information after familiarity is established over time.
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EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 2 was designed to further the investigation of the impact of familiarity
and time on social perception. Within Experiment 2, the area of interest was the
influence of a cognitive load on social perception. Research has consistently shown
that social categorization is influenced by a cognitive load (Bodenhausen, 1988, 1990;
Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993;
Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994; Pendry & Macrae, 1999; Stangor & Duan, 1991).
When individuals are cognitively busy, stereotypes essentially become the “tools that
jump out” of our cognitive toolbox when one does not have the extra cognitive
processes available to look for other tools (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991, p. 510). Experiment 2
extends this existing argument by testing how time (i.e. memory consolidation) impacts
the cognitive load effect on social categorization. As memory consolidation has been
shown to stabilize memories (McGaugh, 2000; Medina et al., 2008; Spear & Mueller,
1984; Walker & Stickgold, 2006), it was predicted that memories learned 48 hr prior to
test should become more resistant to concurrent loads than newly learned memories.
Time will essentially repackage the cognitive toolbox so that the tools that work towards
individuation are now included in the set that “jump out” (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991, p. 510).
Social categorization and cognitive loads
Research suggests that people are “cognitive misers” (Taylor, 1981), which is to
say that they rely on social shortcuts to simplify the task of sorting through the
consistent barrage of social information (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Within this line of
thinking, the use of stereotypes or social categorization is beneficial as these processes
essentially work as time savers and ease the perceptual work for individuals (Gilbert &
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Hixon, 1991; Macrae et al., 1993). However, while social categorization proves to be a
short-cut to organizing our daily world, individuation is a process that requires time and
effort (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). When cognitive resources are low or
limited, individuation is too taxing and individuals switch to the short-cut provided by
categorization (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). In fact, stereotype application is facilitated with
the use of a cognitive load as stereotypes are the easiest and most accessible cognitive
tools available (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae et al., 1993; Pendry & Macrae, 1999).
In 1991, Gilbert and Hixon investigated the impact of cognitive load on social
categorization. Within a word fragment completion task, the authors found that when a
cognitive load was introduced during the application phase (e.g., during the formation of
impressions) of their experiment, participants were more likely to apply their previously
activated stereotypes. Macrae et al. (1993) found similar results with the use of a
videotaped conversation between two females that had either a sex consistent job (i.e.,
hairdresser) or a sex inconsistent job (i.e., doctor). Afterwards, the participants were
asked to recall the conversation. Participants who were also asked to remember an 8digit number during this recall phase (i.e., the application phase), made an increased
amount of stereotypic or target-based judgments. Furthermore, Pendry and Macrae
(1999) found that when participants are cognitively busy they remember more
stereotype consistent information and the variability of the group no longer matters.
Cognitive loads, however, are not necessarily limited to influencing stereotypic or
categorical thinking. While many have argued that the activation of stereotypes is
automatic (Devine, 1989), others have argued that this automaticity may, in fact, be
conditional (Bargh, 1989). Gilbert and Hixon (1991) theorized that it may take more
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than mere exposure to an individual to activate an associated stereotype. The
processes involved in stereotype activation, the authors argued, can also be taxed and
hindered with a cognitive load. Thus, while research has shown that introducing a
cognitive load during the stereotype application process increases stereotypic or
categorical thinking, Gilbert and Hixon hypothesized that taxing cognitive resources
during the stereotype activation processes will eliminate stereotype activation.
Gilbert and Hixon (1991) found that the increased load decreased stereotype
activation when the cognitive load manipulation was employed during the encoding
process. The authors had participants complete a word fragment completion task
where a card turner appeared via a video. The card turner was either a Caucasian or
Asian female. In the cognitively busy condition, participants were asked to remember
an 8-digit number immediately before the video started. After the video, the busy
participants were asked to recall the number followed by asking all participants to recall
the ethnicity of the card turner in the video. Gilbert and Hixon found that the participants
who were kept cognitively busy with the 8-digit task were significantly less likely to recall
stereotypic completions to the word fragments when they viewed the Asian card turner.
Yet, participants in both load conditions were able to recall the ethnicity of the card
turner correctly. The authors concluded that the cognitive load was efficient at
decreasing the activation of stereotypes even though participants were still able to
correctly recall the ethnicity of the card turner. Therefore, the cognitive load actually
eliminated the stereotype activation and turned the Asian card turner into a card turner
that was not based on ethnicity. This finding led to the conclusion that incurring a
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cognitive load during the encoding of stereotypes may facilitate person perception
processes (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991).
The idea that cognitive loads increase social categorization, however, is not
without dispute. Spears, Haslam, and Jansen (1999) argue that both social
categorization and individuation are effortful processes and, as such, both should be
impacted by a cognitive load. Within two separate experiments, Spears et al., found
that social categorization decreased with a cognitive load. How a cognitive load is
conceptualized, however, is an important distinction with this argument. While the
cognitive load studies discussed before used an 8-digit cognitive load manipulation,
Spears et al. (1999) conceptualized cognitive loads as a memory set size. Even with
this difference, the consensus remains that cognitive loads increase social
categorization.
Memory consolidation, sleep, and selective resistance to interference
In order to tie in the systems-level memory consolidation research with the social
categorization and cognitive load theories, one has to ask how systems-level memory
consolidation has been shown to react to cognitive loads in previous cognitive research.
Again, systems-level memory consolidation is defined as a time-dependent process that
involves transforming a newly formed and vulnerable memory trace into a stronger and
more resilient memory (McGaugh, 2000; Medina et al., 2008; Spear & Mueller, 1984;
Walker & Stickgold, 2006). Additionally, memory consolidation processes are thought
to counteract forgetting and form declarative memories that are resistant to interference
(McGaugh, 2000; Walker & Stickgold, 2006). As discussed previously, many
researchers have found evidence that sleep plays a role within the consolidation of
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declarative memories. Furthermore, it has been argued that sleep is the factor that
essentially buffers or protects the new fragile memory from retroactive interference
while the consolidation process is taking place (Wixted, 2004).
In 1967, Ekstrand tested the idea that sleep buffers new memories from
retroactive interference using the A-B, A-C paradigm. The A-B, A-C paradigm involves
the participants learning one list of words where a specific cue word (A) is associated
with a specific target word (B). Participants then learn a second list of words where the
same cue word (A) is now associated with a new target word (C). Within this paradigm,
memory for the first list of words is typically hindered as the second list causes
retroactive interference. Following the A-B, A-C learning paradigm, participants were
then split into groups where they were either tested for retrieval after eight hrs of sleep
or for retrieval in the same day without sleep. Ekstrand (1967) found that the
participants who had slept were able to remember more overall and, more importantly,
were better able to remember the words from the first list. Forty years later,
Drosopoulos, Schuze, Fischer, & Born (2007) replicated Ekstrand’s study and also
found that sleep offsets the effects of retroactive interference on memories.
Cognitive load, categorical thinking, and time
The theory that cognitive loads increase social categorization has been widely
accepted (Bodenhausen, 1988, 1990; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Kruglanski & Freund,
1983; Macrae et al., 1993; Macrae et al., 1994; Pendry & Macrae, 1999; Stangor &
Duan, 1991). This theory, however, also relies on research using newly learned targets
tested during one session. Thus, memory consolidation constructs, once again, point to
some interesting distinctions that may lead to a more realistic test of the cognitive miser
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theory. Research shows that memory consolidation processes selectively strengthen
weakly associated declarative memories against retroactive interference (Drosopoulos
et al., 2007; Ekstrand, 1967). Thus, the argument made previously that individuating
memories reflect an episodic memory and stereotypic memories reflect a semantic
memory becomes relevant here as well.
Cognitive loads are believed to increase social categorization because
individuation involves a complex and effortful process with weaker associations while
social categorization is an effortless task that involves strongly over learned
associations (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae et
al., 1993). Because social categorizations are the stronger and over learned
associations, time (i.e., memory consolidation) may facilitate individuation. The
structural change imposed by memory consolidation may selectively work to enhance
and buffer the weakly associated individuating memories against the effects of
retroactive interference (i.e., a cognitive load). This change may allow one to access
the learned individuating memories and stereotypic memories equally. Thus, time (i.e.,
memory consolidation) may essentially reorganize the cognitive toolbox so the tools for
individuation are more easily accessed during loads. Experiment 2 tests this
hypothesis.
Methods Overview
Experiment 2 further explored the impact of time on social perception by
investigating the impact of a cognitive load on the individuating memories that were
encoded 48 hr earlier. To accomplish this research goal, cognitive loads were
embedded within a categorization task. All participants first completed Experiment 1
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where they acquired individuating memories for 12 targets within the exposure task and
then completed an LDT and a categorization task (See Experiment 1 methods). After
the completion of Experiment 1, participants were then asked to complete Experiment 2.
Experiment 2 was designed to only test the individuation process. Thus, Experiment 2
consisted of a familiar vs. novel categorization task where cognitive load trials were
randomly embedded within the task for each participant. The cognitive load trials
consisted of participants subtracting 3 from a given number (i.e., 92 - 3) and recalling
the answer (i.e., 89) when asked after the categorization. The categorization task
included the 12 familiar targets from the exposure task 48 hr earlier (i.e., intentionally
exposed targets), the 12 targets that were previously exposed as new targets during the
second session of Experiment 1 (i.e., unintentionally exposed targets), and 12 additional
novel targets.
Hypotheses
Within Experiment 2, it was hypothesized that intentionally exposed targets
would be more resistant to concurrent loads when compared to the unintentionally
exposed and novel targets. More specifically, it was hypothesized that during the
cognitive load trials participants would respond to the unintentionally exposed targets
significantly slower than to the intentionally exposed targets. Also, no significant
differences were expected between the load trials and the no load trials for the
intentionally exposed targets. Additionally, it was hypothesized that participants would
respond to the unintentionally exposed targets slower within the load trials than within
the no load trials. It was also hypothesized that time would produce a significant main
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effect. More specifically, participants would respond to the intentionally exposed targets
faster overall than the unintentionally exposed targets.
METHOD
Participants
Experiment 2 and Experiment 1 were run simultaneously with the same
participants. Thus, the participants that took part in Experiment 1 remain the same as
those that took part in Experiment 2. The criteria and number of participants removed
from analyses, however, change within Experiment 2. First, a total of 23 participants
were removed from analyses because they indicated knowing at least one target.
Second, an additional 2 participants were removed from analyses because they selfreported that they did not speak English. Next, a total of 15 additional participants were
removed from analyses due to answering more than 9 of the load answer trials
incorrectly. Within Experiment 2, 36 trials were load answer trials. Within these trials,
participants were asked to give the correct math answer. If participants incorrectly
answered or failed to answer more than 9 of these trials, the cognitive load manipulation
may have had no impact on the participant. Previous research involving a cognitive
load has commonly analyzed data only for participants that correctly recalled at least
75% of a load (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). Thus, the inclusion criterion was followed within
the current experiment. Finally, 17 additional participants were removed from analyses
due to incorrectly answering or not responding to more than 54 of the 108 trials.
Participants who had more than 54 errors were less than 50% correct overall within
Experiment 2.
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After these deletions, a total of 27 (10 female and 17 male) participants were
analyzed. An a priori power analysis, conducted via G*Power 3.0.5 (Faul, Erdfelder,
Lang, & Buchner, 2007); indicated that the total number of participants needed in order
to obtain a power of .81 was 42. Thus, the number of participants analyzed within this
study did not meet the a priori power requirement.
Of the analyzed participants, 20 self-reported as Mexican-American. The
remaining participants self-reported as African-American (n=2), European-American
(n=3), Mexican-National (n=1), and 1 participants self-identified themselves as “other”.
The mean participant age was 21 with a range from 18 – 38 and a mode of 19.
Materials
The photos used within Experiment 1 largely remained the same as within
Experiment 2 and details for the photos are described in full within Experiment 1a
methods. As participants within Experiment 2 also completed the exposure task within
Experiment 1, the same 12 (6 female and 6 male) photos used within the exposure task
described within Experiment 1 were used within the present study. In addition, the 12
novel targets used within the day 2 LDT and categorization tasks of Experiment 1 were
also used within Experiment 2. However, an additional 12 (6 female and 6 male) photos
were employed within Experiment 2. While the specifications and criterion for these
photos remained the same as within Experiment 1, these photos were not used within
Experiment 1 ensuring that these photos were novel to the participants. Each set of
photos represent an initial exposure sequence to which participants were randomly
assigned. Within each of these initial exposure sequences, the male and female photos
were randomly dispersed.
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A total of 44 random numbers between 5 and 100 were also used within
Experiment 2. These random numbers were employed as the cognitive load.
Participants were shown a number and instructed to subtract 3 from the number. All of
the numbers were randomly generated via an online random number generator. A total
of 36 of these numbers were randomly selected to be used within the actual task and
another set of 8 numbers was randomly selected to be used within the practice trials.
All tests were programmed and administered through SuperLab 4.0 software
(Cedrus Corporation, 2007) and participants responded via a generic computer
keyboard.
Procedure
After the completion of Experiment 1, a brief reminder task was administered on
the computer. The reminder task consisted of an additional PowerPoint slide show that
included the 12 target individuals from the exposure task and the 12 previously novel
target individuals from the day 2 LDT and categorization tasks. One target was
presented per slide and each slide contained only the photo of the target. Each slide
was presented for only 5 s. Thus, the entire reminder task was 2 min long.
Following the completion of the reminder task, participants read the instructions
for the categorization task. The test consisted of a familiar vs. novel categorization task.
Cognitive loads were also embedded within the test itself. Thus, half of the trials were
load trials and the other half were no load trials.
No Load Trials. First, a blank screen was presented for 1000 ms. A fixation
point (X) was then presented centrally on the screen for 500 ms. Next, a blank screen
was then presented for 50 ms. Finally, a photo was presented centrally on the
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computer screen for 2000 ms or until the participant responded. Using the keyboard,
participants were instructed to decide, as quickly and accurately as possible, whether
the individual in the photo was familiar or novel. Participants were again explicitly and
verbally informed that familiar meant that they had seen that individual before within the
experiment and novel meant that they had not seen that individual within the
experiment. If the individual in the photo was familiar, participants were instructed to
press “1” on the number pad. If the individual in the photo was novel, participants were
instructed to press “3” on the number pad.
Load Trials. First, a blank screen was presented for 1000 ms. Then, a large red
dot was presented centrally on the computer screen for 500 ms to forewarn the
participants of the upcoming math load. Next, a number was presented centrally on the
computer screen for 2000 ms. Within the instructions, participants had been instructed
to mentally subtract 3 from the given number. Next, a blank screen was then presented
for 50 ms. Finally, a photo was presented centrally on the computer screen for 2000 ms
or until the participant responded. If the individual in the photo was familiar, participants
were instructed to press “1” on the number pad. If the individual in the photo was novel,
participants were instructed to press “3” on the number pad. Finally, the text “Math
Answer?” and a text box appeared centrally on the computer screen until the participant
responded. Participants were instructed to enter the answer to the subtraction problem
previously presented using the number pad.
The test consisted of three blocks of trials with the first block being a practice
block. Within the practice block, the photos consisted of either an apple or banana. If
the photo was a banana, participants were instructed to press “1” on the number pad. If
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the photo was an apple, participants were instructed to press “3” on the number pad.
The practice block also consisted of both load and no load trials. A total of 8 random
numbers were used within the load trials for the practice block. The practice block
consisted of a total of 24 trials in an attempt to let the participants become accustomed
to the task at hand. Within the remaining test blocks, all targets were shown within both
a load trial and a no load trial. Within the second block, half of the targets were shown
within a load trial and the other half were shown within a no load trial. The third block
reversed the targets within load and no load trials. The order that the second and third
blocks were presented to the participant was randomized in order to control for any
order effects. This categorization task consisted of a total of 132 trials and took
approximately 20 min to complete. Upon completion of the test, all participants were
then asked to complete The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996), the
Ambivalence toward Men Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1999), and prior familiarity check in a
randomized order. Participants were then fully debriefed on both Experiment 1 and
Experiment 2 and were dismissed.
Results
RTs below 200 ms were deleted from analyses. As done in previous research
(Zárate et al., 2000; 2008) and within Experiment 1, only correct RTs between 200 ms
to 1,500 ms were analyzed. The aggregate means were evaluated for normality and all
response means fell within acceptable limits and no transformations were used.
The main design of Experiment 2 was a 3 (Target Type: intentionally exposed,
unintentionally exposed, or novel) X 2 (Cognitive Load: load or no-load) within-subjects
design with RT serving as the dependent variable. The analysis only revealed a
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significant main effect of Target Type, F(2, 52)=28.11, p<.0001. As predicted, planned
comparisons showed that participants were faster to respond to the intentionally
exposed targets (M=697, SD=56) than to the unintentionally exposed targets (M=744,
SD=60). Additionally, participants responded significantly faster to the exposed targets
than the new targets (M=764, SD=53). This main analysis, however, failed to produce
the predicted Target Type X Load interaction, F(2, 52)=2.17, p=.124. Moreover, the
analysis also failed to produce the predicted main effect of Load, F(1, 26)=.55, ns.
Because it was hypothesized that the intentionally exposed targets would be
more resilient to concurrent loads when compared to the unintentionally exposed
targets, difference scores of the load and no load trials were conducted and analyzed.
These difference scores calculated the amount of change in RT between a no load trial
and a load trial. Positive numbers indicated the no load trials were slower than load
trials and negative numbers indicated that the load trials were slower than the no load
trials. However, a one-way repeated measures analysis of these difference scores for
both the intentionally and unintentionally exposed targets failed to reveal a significant
difference, F(1, 26)=.92, ns. Due to the drastic amount of data that was eliminated from
the above analyses and in an attempt to better understand the data, this same one-way
analysis was conducted without the error deletions. Thus, rather than analyzing 26 data
sets this analysis included 38 data sets. However, this analysis also failed to produce a
significant finding, F(1, 37)=.66, ns.
Discussion
Experiment 2 investigated the impact of familiarity and time on cognitive loads
within a social perception task. Experiment 2 utilized a familiar vs. novel categorization
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task with cognitive loads embedded within the task. Participants learned personalizing
information about 12 targets 48 hr prior to the test and were then unintentionally
exposed to an additional 12 targets in the duration of the second session of Experiment
1. The ensuing analyses revealed only a significant main effect of Target Type where
participants responded faster to the targets exposed 48 hr earlier (i.e., intentionally
exposed) than to the targets exposed within the same day (i.e., unintentionally
exposed).
Due to a large error rate, 68% of the data was removed from analyses which
resulted in this experiment being underpowered. Therefore, any interpretation of
analyses should be done with the idea of repairing the cognitive load manipulation and
re-running this experiment again in the future.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present research explored the impact of familiarity and time on social
perception processes. Familiarity was manipulated with an exposure task. Within the
exposure task, participants learned individualizing information about 12 targets. Time
was manipulated by testing the participants both 2-6 hr and 48 hr after the exposure
task. Therefore, the time between exposure and test was either within the same day (26 hr) after the exposure task or two full days (48 hr) after the exposure task.
Experiment 1 investigated the influence of familiarity and time on the argument of the
automaticity of social categorization and associated stereotypes by separating the
argument into two parts. First, Experiment 1a tested the influence of familiarity and time
on associated stereotypes. Contrary to the prevailing arguments made in social
perception literature, Experiment 1a found that, with familiarity and time, participants
responded to individualizing information faster than to stereotypic information. Second,
Experiment 1b tested the influence of familiarity and time on social categorization and
found further support for previous findings. Experiment 2 further investigated the
influence of familiarity and time on social perception processes by imbedding a
cognitive load into a social categorization task. Experiment 2 found little support for the
hypothesis that familiarity and time would influence social categorization and cognitive
loads. Experiment 2 found only that participants were overall faster to respond to the
targets they had learned 48 hr earlier than to the targets they had been exposed to 20
min earlier.
Experiment 1 was designed to test the impact of familiarity and time on a
consistent argument with social perception research: social categorization and the
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associated stereotypes are automatic processes (Brewer, 1988; Fiske, 1989; Dovidio et
al., 1986; Fazio & Dunton, 1997; Kawakami et al, 2000; Stroessner, 1996; Zárate &
Smith, 1990). Specifically, Experiment 1 tested the influence of familiarity and time on
social perception with the use of both a LDT and a categorization task. This distinction
was specifically designed to better investigate the argument that both social
categorization and the associated stereotypes are automatically activated by breaking
the argument into two separate arguments. Experiment 1b was designed to test the
argument that social categorization is automatic by manipulating familiarity and time
within a social categorization task. Experiment 1a was specifically designed to test the
argument that the associated stereotypes are also automatically activated by
manipulating familiarity and time within a LDT.
The first part of this argument (i.e., social categorization is automatic) revolves
around the idea that social categorization is a time-saving and well-practiced activity
that we use daily (Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). Due to this constant practice, individuals are
able to perceive and categorize others by age, race, and sex very quickly which leads to
the argument that social categorization is an automatic process. In fact, Experiment 1b
provided further evidence that social categorization may, in fact, be an automatic
process. Even when participants were given individuating information about a target
and time for those memory traces to become enhanced and stabilized, participants
were still faster to categorize targets by sex. In fact, participants were faster to
categorize the learned targets than the novel targets. It seems, then, that familiarity and
time may work to facilitate categorization rather than impede categorization processes.
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Still, Experiment 1b found further support for the argument that social categorization is
an automatic cognitive process.
The same, however, may not be said about the second part of the argument.
The second part of this argument states that the stereotypes associated with the
automatically categorized group are also automatically activated. For example, when a
female target has been automatically categorized as a “woman”, female stereotypes
such as “warm” or “moody” are also automatically activated. Additionally, the argument
that stereotypes are automatically activated has also led the debate regarding the
inevitability of stereotyping others (Devine, 1989; Lepore & Brown, 1997). Experiment
1a, on the other hand, asked if inevitability of stereotype activation really depicts the
whole picture of social perception. Are people always automatically sexist/racist or has
social perception research simply been missing a piece of the puzzle? In fact,
Experiment 1a provides evidence that stereotypes are not always first to be
automatically activated. When associated with the learned targets, participants were
faster to respond to the provided individualizing information when tested 48 hr after
exposure than when tested only 2-6 hr after exposure. That is, when participants were
provided with individualizing information about a target and time for those memory
traces to become enhanced and stabilized, the individualizing information was activated
faster. Moreover, when tested 48 hr after exposure, participants were faster to react to
the individualizing information associated with the learned targets than to the stereotypic
group information associated with the learned targets. That is, when individuals were
given time for the individualizing memory traces to become enhanced and stabilized,
they not only used that information faster than without time but they were now faster to
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rely on the individualizing information rather than the stereotypical information. Thus, in
contrast to previous arguments, Experiment 1a found support that familiarity and time
leads to the automatic activation of the associated individualizing information. While
this finding contradicts previous research, Experiment 1a also found support for the
argument that stereotypes are automatically activated. First, participants were faster to
respond to the stereotypic group information associated with the novel targets than to
the individualizing information when tested both 2-6 hr and 48 hr after exposure.
Furthermore, participants were still faster to respond to the stereotypic group
information associated with the learned targets when tested only 2-6 hr after exposure.
This provides evidence that familiarity alone is not enough to change people’s automatic
perceptions. Familiarity paired with time, however, is enough to do so.
Overall, the results within Experiment 1b lead to the conclusion that
categorization may occur automatically. However, Experiment 1a shows that this
automatic categorization does not always lead to an automatic activation of associated
stereotypes. On the other hand, when people are given individualizing information
about a target and time for these memories to stabilize, an automatic categorization
may lead to an automatic activation of individualizing information.
Previous research on the automaticity of social categorization and the associated
stereotypes has consistently tested only first impressions of newly learned targets.
However, when only testing new targets, research is drastically oversimplifying a
complex process. Thus, in order to grasp the whole picture of social perceptual
processes, research also needs to test the impact of later impressions of familiar
targets. The design of Experiment 1 was meant to examine the claims made by the
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majority of previous social perception studies that test only first impressions on newly
learned targets. Experiment 1 begins to provide a more realistic picture of the
processes involved within social perception by asking how familiarity and time
influences perceptions. When experiments only provide a photo of a target, the only
information participants have to use within social perception tasks is the target’s
appearance. Furthermore, the appearance of a target only provides social group
information (e.g, a black male). Experiment 1, however, finds that when participants are
provided with more information about the target and time for the information to become
stabilized, participants utilize the individualizing information faster than the group
information. Providing minimal information about a target may also be more desirable
to the participant. As a social rule, people try to refrain from forming impressions of
people on the basis of stereotypic information alone (Yzerbyt et al., 1994). Thus,
providing more information than simply a photo of a target allows a participant to use
that information to form an impression. This is an option that is not provided within the
standard social perception experimental design.
Additionally, the moderators of familiarity and time are naturally occurring variables
within everyday life. While familiarity and time were experimentally manipulated and
contrived within the current experiments, a similar version of this manipulation occurs
everyday in the real world. As people, we acquire familiar strangers within our daily life.
Whether a familiar stranger is the salesperson at a shop or a fellow student in a college
seminar, familiar strangers are all around us and we interact with these people typically
on a daily basis. We also learn information about our familiar strangers. The
information we acquire about these familiar strangers is not extensive, but we gather
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little pieces of information every time we interact or simply see that familiar stranger.
Additionally, this type of minimal familiarity also requires time. We may have to see this
familiar stranger three or more times over a period of days in order for that individual to
become truly familiar to us. Thus, the use of familiarity and time within a social
perception experiment begins to provide a more realistic picture of real-life social
perception processes.
The findings within Experiment 1a also fit within a memory consolidation
perspective. The variable of time was based upon memory consolidation theories and
constructs and was, therefore, manipulated so that participants were tested both within
the same day as the exposure and 48 hr after exposure. Stickgold, James, and Hobson
(2000) argue that while learning begins with people participating in the training task, the
consolidation of the information during sleep in the following 48 hr is also crucial to
learning. Thus, memory consolidation shows optimal improvement when the test is 48
hr after the first learning experience and the participants sleep between tasks. Due to
this argument and the consistent finding that both slow-wave and rapid eye movement
sleep processes are somehow involved within memory consolidation, the tests 48 hr
after exposure were expected to show the predicted influence of time.
As research has argued that memory consolidation provides a way for episodic
memories to become integrated within semantic memories (Spear & Mueller, 1984), the
argument may be extended that memory consolidation can do the same for
individuating (i.e., episodic) memories and stereotypic (i.e., semantic) memories. This
integration then provides a mechanism through which individuating experiences with an
individual become associated with that individual over a period of time. Moreover,
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memory consolidation research has found that consolidation does not strengthen all
declarative memories equally (Drosopoulos et al., 2007, p. 170; Ekstrand, 1977).
Rather, consolidation may selectively strengthen a memory that has been weakly
associated more so than strongly associated memories. Experiment 1a found support
for this theory. When tested 48 hr after exposure, participants were faster to respond to
the individuating information (i.e., episodic memories) than to the stereotypic information
(i.e., semantic memories) for the learned targets. The fact that the associations
between the learned targets and the individuating information were weaker than the
over-learned stereotypic associations may have prompted a consolidation process to
selectively strengthen those memories. Thus, the current experiments, while not
explicitly measuring memory consolidation, suggest that memory consolidation may
influence social perception.
The proposed experiments, however, are not without an acknowledged
confound. The order of tasks was not counterbalanced. For instance, during day 1, all
participants completed the day 1 LDT and then the day 1 categorization task.
Furthermore, participants were tested on the same set of learned targets within both of
the day 1 tasks. The lack of counterbalancing the order of tasks might have contributed
to the lack of influence of time within Experiment 1b. If participants had just been tested
on the learned targets during the day 1 LDT, one may question then whether time would
have an impact on the day 1 categorization task at all due to a possible recency effect
or repeated testing effect.
Furthermore, there are alternative explanations for the influence of time other than
memory consolidation. One of these explanations involves the use of the impression
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formation questionnaire. Hallmarks of memory consolidation include stable and more
easily retrieved memories that are more resistant to interference. Conceptually, this
mirrors memory brought about through deeper cognitive processing. According to the
levels of processing model of memory (Craik & Lockhart, 1972), there are no individual
stores of memory, but rather, memory functions as a continuum whose effectiveness
varies upon the depth of cognitive processing given to an item. Items that are
processed at a deep-level are more likely to be recalled than items processed at a
shallow level due to the processing of the item at encoding. Some researchers have
argued that this deeper level of encoding is intrinsically interwoven with the quality of
the processing instead of the quantity of processing (Winograd, 1981). According to the
elaboration hypothesis, making assumptions about a person’s personality traits will
assist one’s memory of this person due to a broader feature sampling (1981). Asking
participants to make personalizing assumptions about the target individuals based upon
given information will facilitate their feature sampling of that target which, in turn, will
lead to a deeper encoding of that information. Furthermore, other research has shown
that a self-reference effect also facilitates a deep-level of encoding (Rogers, Kuiper, &
Kirker, 1977). For example, asking a participant to think of personality traits in terms of
themselves proves to enable a deeper level of encoding. Together, this facilitates the
participant’s ability to form an impression of each target individual which facilitates the
participant’s memory for the personality traits (Hamilton, Katz, & Leirer, 1980). Depth of
memory and memory consolidation, however, could also prove to be intrinsically
interwoven and difficult to separate. However, the experimental procedure used within
this study did not manipulate the depth of processing elicited within each participant.
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An additional alternative explanation is that of spaced learning. Often referred to
as the spacing effect, it has been generally accepted that learning is most benefited by
spacing intervals of learning as opposed to a massed learning section (Atkinson, 1972;
Karpicke & Roediger, 2007; Pavlik & Anderson, 2005; Pavlik & Anderson, 2008;
Underwood, 1970). Once again, attempting to disentangle effects of spaced learning
and time from memory consolidation is difficult. According to Cepeda, Pashler, Vul,
Wixted, and Rohrer (2006), learning is only considered to be massed when the lag
between the learning is less than one second. Thus, any studies involving a
manipulation of time necessarily involves learning that is defined as spaced.
Future Directions
Experiment 2 investigated the impact of time on social perception processes with
a cognitive load. However, this study was severely underpowered due to a large
amount of excluded data. The main reason behind this exclusion was participant error.
In fact, a total of 32 participants (15 for load errors and 17 for overall errors) were
excluded from the analyses. That is, 38% of the data was not analyzed due to
participant error. With all of the deletions, only data from 27 participants was analyzed
leaving Experiment 2 underpowered.
The fact that the major reason for this exclusion was participant error leads one
to suspect that the task in and of itself was too difficult for participants. For instance,
perhaps the cognitive load manipulation was too strong. While it is obvious that the
cognitive load manipulation worked, it might have worked too well. The task of
subtracting 3 from a random number is not a hard task by itself. However, as this task
was randomly embedded with a familiar vs. novel categorization task, the combination
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of the two tasks proved to be difficult. To add to this difficulty, participants were only
shown the initial number for 2 s and were then shown a photo to categorize only 50 ms
later. Furthermore, the actual categorization task might have added to this difficulty
further. The categorization task within Experiment 2 was a familiar vs. novel
categorization. Thus, the participants had to decide as quickly as possible whether the
photo that was shown was someone they had previously seen within the experiment.
The difficulty in this task is really due to two reasons. First, this task is not as wellpracticed and automatic as a social categorization task. Second, the targets within this
task included the intentionally exposed targets, unintentionally exposed targets, and
novel targets. The problem lies within distinguishing familiarity between the
unintentionally exposed targets and the novel targets. Participants had seen the
unintentionally exposed targets only a limited number of times. Initially, the
unintentionally exposed targets had only been exposed to the participants 20 min before
Experiment 2 for a total of eight times for 400 ms within Experiment 1. Additionally, the
unintentionally exposed targets were shown once for a total of 5 s during a relearning
task. So, the unintentionally exposed targets had only been exposed to participants for
a total of 8.2 s. Therefore, distinguishing whether they had seen that target would have
added to the difficulty of the task due to a possible confusion between the
unintentionally exposed targets and the novel targets.
Still, while interpreted with caution, the results within Experiment 2 lead to the
unresolved question of whether or not time will impact cognitive loads differentially
within a social perception task. The design of Experiment 2, however, needs to be
rethought. First, the task itself should be an easier task. Given the results of
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Experiment 1, a future study should investigate the impact of time and cognitive loads
on stereotype associations rather than categorization. Additionally, employing a LDT
would also make the task easier for the participant and result in less participant error.
Furthermore, a future study should also use a between-subjects design rather than the
within-subjects design employed within Experiment 2. Doing so would alleviate the
need to imbed a cognitive load randomly throughout a task and reduce confusion.
Finally, a future study should also employ an easier cognitive load technique. As the
load (i.e., subtract by three) method seemed to overload participants within Experiment
2, one might suggest using the common load of remembering an eight digit number
(Gilbert & Hixon, 1991).
In addition to rethinking Experiment 2, future studies should continue to
investigate the impact of familiarity and time within social perception processes. For
instance, given the results of Experiment 1, the next logical question might be how
familiarity and time impacts prejudice? One future study might investigate this by
manipulating familiarity and time within an IAT or within a LDT using positive and
negative words. Future studies should also further investigate the impact of familiarity
and time on associated stereotypes. For example, extending the results within
Experiment 1 to look at how familiarity and time impact the cerebral asymmetries
previously found within social perception (Rivera, Arms-Chavez, & Zárate, In Press;
Sanders, McClure, & Zárate, 2004; Zárate et al., 2000; Zárate et al., 2008).
Additionally, in order to fully investigate the automatic and controlled cognitive
processes involved, it would be interesting to extend the results of Experiment 1 by
employing a process dissociation paradigm (Payne, 2008). Because the influence of
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familiarity and time is a largely unexplored yet demonstrably important topic within
social perception research, it has the potential to initiate a variety of novel research
questions.
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CONCLUSION
Further evidence was found for the argument that social categorization is an
automatic cognitive process. However, when people are given information about an
individual and time for the memory to stabilize, the stereotypes associated with the
categorization are no longer automatically activated. Rather, with familiarity and time,
the individuating information associated with the individual is automatically activated.
That is, with familiarity and time, people individuate targets faster than stereotype
targets. Therefore, investigating the impact of familiarity and time provides yet another
piece of the complex social perception puzzle.
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APPENDIX A: Sleep Check Questionnaire.
Please answer the following questions about the time spent between Session 1 and
Session 2. Your answers to the following questions will in no way impact your
participation in this study, so please answer them honestly.
1. Did you fall asleep at any time during the break today?
Yes

No

1a. If you answered “Yes”, for approximately how
long did you sleep?
_____________________________________
2. Were you kept consistently busy during the break today?
Yes

No

3. Were you able to go relax during the break today?
Yes

No

4. Did you take a nap during the break today?
Yes

No

4a. If you answered “Yes”, for approximately how long did you sleep?
_____________________________________

79

APPENDIX B: Sleep Quality Questionnaire.
Your answers to the following questions will not affect your participation in the study, so please
answer them honestly.

1. During the 2 day break, how many hours (approximately) did you sleep the FIRST night?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10+

1a. On a scale from 0 to 100, 0 being not at all refreshing/restorative and 100 being
very refreshing/restorative, please indicate how refreshing/restorative this sleep
was.
0
10
Not at all
Restorative

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100
Very
Restorative

2. During the 2 day break, how many hours (approximately) did you sleep the SECOND
night?
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10+

2a. On a scale from 0 to 100, 0 being not at all refreshing/restorative and 100 being
very refreshing/restorative, please indicate how refreshing/restorative this sleep
was.
0
10
Not at all
Restorative

20

30

40

50

80

60

70

80

90

100
Very
Restorative

APPENDIX C: Impression Formation Questionnaire.
Armando
How friendly do you think Armando is?
1
Not at all
Friendly

2
Slightly
Friendly

3
Moderately
Friendly

4
Mostly
Friendly

5
Extremely
Friendly

3
Moderately

4
Mostly

5
Extremely

How much do you like Armando?
1
Not at all

2
Slightly

*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*
Monica
How friendly do you think Monica is?
1
Not at all
Friendly

2
Slightly
Friendly

3
Moderately
Friendly

4
Mostly
Friendly

5
Extremely
Friendly

3
Moderately

4
Mostly

5
Extremely

How much do you like Monica?
1
Not at all

2
Slightly

*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*
Miguel
How friendly do you think Miguel is?
1
Not at all
Friendly

2
Slightly
Friendly

3
Moderately
Friendly

4
Mostly
Friendly

5
Extremely
Friendly

3
Moderately

4
Mostly

5
Extremely

How much do you like Miguel?
1
Not at all

2
Slightly

*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*~*
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APPENDIX D: Prior Familiarity Check.
1. Do you know any of the people in the photos seen in this experiment
PERSONALLY? In other words, do you personally know any of these
individuals in real life?

2. If "YES", please indicate in what task of THIS EXPERIMENT you saw this
individual if you can. (I don't need to know where you personally know
them from...)
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APPENDIX E: Word Stimuli.

Names:
•

Female Names:
o Monica
o Claudia
o Julia
o Rosa
o Ana
o Maria

•

Male Names:
o Miguel
o Jesus
o Armando
o Carlos
o Javier
o Efrain

Unique Traits:

EXPSOURE A

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

EXPOSURE B

Trait

Unique

Frequency

Length

Honest
Lively
Wise
Direct
Playful
Frugal
Secure
Fiesty
Ornery
Naïve
Candid
Modest

U

35.98

6

1

U

13.74

6

2

U

35.14

4

3

U

95.64

6

4

U

2.96

7

5

U

1.9

6

6

U

34.19

6

7

U

0

6

8

U

0.34

6

9

U

3.18

4

10

U

2.29

6

11

U
Freq
Avg=

29.11

6

12

254.47
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Trait

Unique

Frequency

Length

Humble
Logical
Relaxed
Funny
Driven
Messy
Corny
Tense
Smart
Vain
Polite
Shy

U

11.34

6

U

28.1

7

U

29.66

7

U

49.33

5

U

39.55

6

U

3.97

5

U

1.12

5

U

17.6

5

U

21.68

5

U

13.35

4

U

21.34

6

U
Freq Avg
=

18.04

3

255.08

Stereotypic Traits:
• Female
o Bossy (-)
o Caring (+)
o Frail (-)
o Gentle (+)
o Kind (+)
o Loyal (+)
o Moody (-)
o Needy (-)
o Nice (+)
o Picky (-)
o Warm (+)
o Weak (-)
• Male
o Active (+)
o Brave (+)
o Brutal (-)
o Cold (-)
o Daring (+)
o Dull (-)
o Fit (+)
o Hasty (-)
o Lazy (-)
o Macho (+)
o Proud (+)
o Rude (-)
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Non-words:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

bisrg
ciern
losri
golptar
cularik
epoarl
alwek
yarsin
tabyag
yibulas
folut
visrey
otasir
hamit
intes
frink
kopsek
cofals
hanolis
revinsy
cauliny
koskos
malify
reyas
tanbic
surped
yaroff
tilfine

34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
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epotosi
elbat
lebasy
retnew
nimzaj
licnep
alako
drowie
siarund
nackish
retaw
ghading
oledder
tenduts
murnit
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